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Background: Testing and validation of the semantic correctness of patchesprovided by tools for Automated Program Repairs (APR) has received a lot ofattention. Yet, the eventual acceptance or rejection of suggested patches forreal world projects by humans patch reviewers has received a limited attention.Objective: To address this issue, we plan to investigate whether (possiblyincorrect) security patches suggested by APR tools are recognized by humanreviewers. We also want to investigate whether knowing that a patch wasproduced by an allegedly specialized tool does change the decision of humanreviewers. Method: In the first phase, using a balanced design, we propose tohuman reviewers a combination of patches proposed by APR tools for differentvulnerabilities and ask reviewers to adopt or reject the proposed patches. Inthe second phase, we tell participants that some of the proposed patches weregenerated by security specialized tools (even if the tool was actually a`normal' APR tool) and measure whether the human reviewers would change theirdecision to adopt or reject a patch. Limitations: The experiment will beconducted in an academic setting, and to maintain power, it will focus on alimited sample of popular APR tools and popular vulnerability types.

On the acceptance by code reviewers of candidate security patches suggested by Automated Program Repair tools