English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We consider a multi-agent system in which a decentralized team of agentscontrols a stochastic system in the presence of an adversary. Instead ofcommitting to a fixed information sharing protocol, the agents canstrategically decide at each time whether to share their private informationwith each other or not. The agents incur a cost whenever they communicate witheach other and the adversary may eavesdrop on their communication. Thus, theagents in the team must effectively coordinate with each other while beingrobust to the adversary's malicious actions. We model this interaction betweenthe team and the adversary as a stochastic zero-sum game where the team aims tominimize a cost while the adversary aims to maximize it. Under some assumptionson the adversary's capabilities, we characterize a min-max control andcommunication strategy for the team. We supplement this characterization withseveral structural results that can make the computation of the min-maxstrategy more tractable.

Optimal Communication and Control Strategies for a Multi-Agent System in the Presence of an Adversary