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We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structuredmultiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether acertain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, orswapping approvals, where each such action comes at a cost and we are limitedby a budget. We assume our elections to either have the candidate interval orthe voter interval property, and we require the property to hold also after thebribery. While structured elections usually make manipulative attackssignificantly easier, our work also shows examples of the opposite behavior. Weconclude by presenting preliminary insights regarding the destructive variantof our problem.

Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election