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It is increasingly possible for real-world agents, such as software-basedagents or human institutions, to view the internal programming of other suchagents that they interact with. For instance, a company can read the bylaws ofanother company, or one software system can read the source code of another.Game-theoretic equilibria between the designers of such agents are called\emph{program equilibria}, and we call this area \emph{open-source gametheory}.  In this work we demonstrate a series of counterintuitive results onopen-source games, which are independent of the programming language in whichagents are written. We show that certain formal institution designs that onemight expect to defect against each other will instead turn out to cooperate,or conversely, cooperate when one might expect them to defect. The results holdin a setting where each institution has full visibility into the otherinstitution's true operating procedures. We also exhibit examples and ten openproblems for better understanding these phenomena. We argue that contemporarygame theory remains ill-equipped to study program equilibria, given that eventhe outcomes of single games in open-source settings remain counterintuitiveand poorly understood. Nonetheless, some of these open-source agents exhibitdesirable characteristics -- e.g., they can unexploitably create incentives forcooperation and legibility from other agents -- such that analyzing them couldyield considerable benefits.

Cooperative and uncooperative institution designs: Surprises and problems in open-source game theory