English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

In this note we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majorityvoting. We show that under some assumptions usual in this literature, with aneven number of voters if the core of the voting situation is singleton (and inthe interior of the policy space) then the element in the core is never aCondorcet winner. This is in sharp contrast with what happens with an oddnumber of voters: in that case, under identical assumptions, it is well knownthat if the core of the voting situation is non-empty then the single elementin the core is the Condorcet winner as well.

On spatial majority voting with an even (vis-a-vis odd) number of voters: a note