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We present IPvSeeYou, a privacy attack that permits a remote and unprivilegedadversary to physically geolocate many residential IPv6 hosts and networks withstreet-level precision. The crux of our method involves: 1) remotelydiscovering wide area (WAN) hardware MAC addresses from home routers; 2)correlating these MAC addresses with their WiFi BSSID counterparts of knownlocation; and 3) extending coverage by associating devices connected to acommon penultimate provider router.  We first obtain a large corpus of MACs embedded in IPv6 addresses viahigh-speed network probing. These MAC addresses are effectively leaked up theprotocol stack and largely represent WAN interfaces of residential routers,many of which are all-in-one devices that also provide WiFi. We develop atechnique to statistically infer the mapping between a router's WAN and WiFiMAC addresses across manufacturers and devices, and mount a large-scale datafusion attack that correlates WAN MACs with WiFi BSSIDs available in wardriving(geolocation) databases. Using these correlations, we geolocate the IPv6prefixes of $>$12M routers in the wild across 146 countries and territories.Selected validation confirms a median geolocation error of 39 meters. We thenexploit technology and deployment constraints to extend the attack to a largerset of IPv6 residential routers by clustering and associating devices with acommon penultimate provider router. While we responsibly disclosed our resultsto several manufacturers and providers, the ossified ecosystem of deployedresidential cable and DSL routers suggests that our attack will remain aprivacy threat into the foreseeable future.

IPvSeeYou: Exploiting Leaked Identifiers in IPv6 for Street-Level Geolocation