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We study the role of quantum communication in attacks on quantum positionverification. In this work, we construct the first known example of a QPVprotocol that is provably secure against unentangled attackers restricted toclassical communication, but can be perfectly attacked by local operations anda single round of simultaneous quantum communication indicating that allowingfor quantum communication may break security. We also show that any protocolsecure against classical communication can be transformed into a protocolsecure against quantum communication. We further show, using arguments based onthe monogamy of entanglement, that the task of Bell state discrimination cannotbe done locally with a single round of quantum communication, not evenprobabilistically (when we allow attackers to say loss sometimes), making thisthe first fully loss-tolerant QPV task secure against quantum communicationattacks. Finally, we observe that any multi-round QPV protocol can be attackedwith a linear amount of entanglement if the loss is high enough.

On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification