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Differential signaling is a method of data transmission that uses twocomplementary electrical signals to encode information. This allows a receiverto reject any noise by looking at the difference between the two signals,assuming the noise affects both signals in the same way. Many protocols such asUSB, Ethernet, and HDMI use differential signaling to achieve a robustcommunication channel in a noisy environment. This generally works well and hasled many to believe that it is infeasible to remotely inject attacking signalsinto such a differential pair. In this paper we challenge this assumption andshow that an adversary can in fact inject malicious signals from a distance,purely using common-mode injection, i.e., injecting into both wires at the sametime. We show how this allows an attacker to inject bits or even arbitrarymessages into a communication line. Such an attack is a significant threat tomany applications, from home security and privacy to automotive systems,critical infrastructure, or implantable medical devices; in which incorrectdata or unauthorized control could cause significant damage, or even fatalaccidents.  We show in detail the principles of how an electromagnetic signal can bypassthe noise rejection of differential signaling, and eventually result inincorrect bits in the receiver. We show how an attacker can exploit this toachieve a successful injection of an arbitrary bit, and we analyze the successrate of injecting longer arbitrary messages. We demonstrate the attack on areal system and show that the success rate can reach as high as $90\%$.Finally, we present a case study where we wirelessly inject a message into aController Area Network (CAN) bus, which is a differential signaling busprotocol used in many critical applications, including the automotive andaviation sector.

Electromagnetic Signal Injection Attacks on Differential Signaling