English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

The sea crossing from Libya to Italy is one of the world's most dangerous andpolitically contentious migration routes, and yet over half a million peoplehave attempted the crossing since 2014. Leveraging data on aggregate migrationflows and individual migration incidents, we estimate how migrants andsmugglers have reacted to changes in border enforcement, namely the rise ininterceptions by the Libyan Coast Guard starting in 2017 and the correspondingdecrease in the probability of rescue at sea. We find support for a deterrenceeffect in which attempted crossings along the Central Mediterranean routedeclined, and a diversion effect in which some migrants substituted to theWestern Mediterranean route. At the same time, smugglers adapted their tactics.Using a strategic model of the smuggler's choice of boat size, we estimate howsmugglers trade off between the short-run payoffs to launching overcrowdedboats and the long-run costs of making less successful crossing attempts underdifferent levels of enforcement. Taken together, these analyses shed light onhow the integration of incident- and flow-level datasets can inform ongoingmigration policy debates and identify potential consequences of changingenforcement regimes.

Strategic Choices of Migrants and Smugglers in the Central Mediterranean Sea