English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

This paper establishes the Price of Stability (PoS) for First Price Auctions,for all equilibrium concepts that have been studied in the literature: BayesNash Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Correlated Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ BayesCoarse Correlated Equilibrium}  $\bullet$ Bayes Nash Equilibrium: For independent valuations, the tight PoSis $1 - 1/ e^{2} \approx 0.8647$, matching the counterpart Price of Anarchy(PoA) bound \cite{JL22}. For correlated valuations, the tight $\PoS$ is $1 - 1/ e \approx 0.6321$, matching the counterpart PoA bound \cite{ST13,S14}. Thisresult indicates that, in the worst cases, efficiency degradation depends noton different selections among Bayes Nash Equilibria.  $\bullet$ Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium: For independent orcorrelated valuations, the tight PoS is always $1 = 100\%$, i.e., no efficiencydegradation, different from the counterpart PoA bound $1 - 1 / e \approx0.6321$ \cite{ST13,S14}. This result indicates that First Price Auctions can befully efficient when we allow the more general equilibrium concepts.

The Price of Stability for First Price Auction