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This paper studies a dynamic information acquisition model with payoffexternalities. Two players can acquire costly information about an unknownstate before taking a safe or risky action. Both information and the actiontaken are private. The first player to take the risky action has an advantagebut whether the risky action is profitable depends on the state. The playersface the tradeoff between being first and being right. In equilibrium, fordifferent priors, there exist three kinds of randomisation: when the playersare pessimistic, they enter the competition randomly; when the players are lesspessimistic, they acquire information and then randomly stop; when the playersare relatively optimistic, they randomly take an action without acquiringinformation.

Private Information Acquisition and Preemption: a Strategic Wald Problem