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The Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) is an important metering device for smartgrid. Like any other Intelligent Electronic Device (IED), PMUs are prone tovarious types of cyberattacks. However, one form of attack is unique to thePMU, the GPS-spoofing attack, where the time and /or the one second pulse (1PPS) that enables time synchronization are modified and the measurements arecomputed using the modified time reference. This article exploits thevulnerability of PMUs in their GPS time synchronization signal. At first, thepaper proposes an undetectable gradual GPS-spoofing attack with smallincremental angle deviation over time. The angle deviation changes power flowcalculation through the branches of the grids, without alerting the SystemOperator (SO) during off-peak hour. The attacker keeps instigating slowincremental variation in power flow calculation caused by GPS-spoofingrelentlessly over a long period of time, with a goal of causing the power flowcalculation breach the MVA limit of the branch at peak-hour. The attack isapplied by solving a convex optimization criterion at regular time interval, sothat after a specific time period the attack vector incurs a significant changein the angle measurements transmitted by the PMU. Secondly, while the attackmodifies the angle measurements with GPS-spoofing attack, it ensures theundetectibility of phase angle variation by keeping the attack vector less thanattack detection threshold. The proposed attack model is tested with WeightedLeast Squared Error (WLSE), Kalman Filtering, and Hankel-matrix basedGPS-spoofing attack detection models. Finally, we have proposed a gradient oflow-rank approximation of Hankel-matrix based detection method to detect suchrelentless small incremental GPS-spoofing attack.

Undetectable GPS-Spoofing Attack on Time Series Phasor Measurement Unit Data