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We are often faced with the non-trivial task of designing incentivemechanisms in the era of Web3. As history has shown, many Web3 services failedmostly due to the lack of a rigorous incentive mechanism design based on tokeneconomics. However, traditional mechanism design, where there is an assumptionthat the users of services strategically make decisions so that their expectedprofits are maximized, often does not capture their real behavior well as itignores humans' psychological bias in making decisions under uncertainty. Inthis paper, we propose an incentive mechanism design for crypto-enabledservices using behavioral economics. Specifically, we take an example of acrypto lottery game in this work and incorporate a seminal work of cumulativeprospect theory into its lottery game mechanism (or rule) design. We designedfour mechanisms and compared them in terms of utility, a metric of howappealing a mechanism is to participants, and a game operator's expectedprofit. Our approach is generic and will be applicable to a wide range ofcrypto-based services where a decision has to be made under uncertainty.

Web3 Meets Behavioral Economics: An Example of Profitable Crypto Lottery Mechanism Design