English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We study settings in which agents with incomplete preferences need to make acollective decision. We focus on a process of majority dynamics where issuesare addressed one at a time and undecided agents follow the opinion of themajority. We assess the effects of this process on various consensus notions --such as the Condorcet winner -- and show that in the worst case, myopicadherence to the majority damages existing consensus; yet, simulationexperiments indicate that the damage is often mild. We also examine scenarioswhere the chair of the decision process can control the existence (or theidentity) of consensus, by determining the order in which the issues arediscussed.

Let's Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics