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In security analysis, attack trees are a major tool for showing thestructural decomposition of attacks and for supporting the evaluation of thequantitative properties (called attributes) of the attacks. However, thevalidities of decompositions are not established by attack trees themselves,and fallacious decisions about security may be made when the attack trees areinaccurate. This paper enriches attack trees with effects of attacks, with aformal system focusing on refinement scenarios. Relationships among effectsindicate relationships among attacks and it allows for a systematic evaluationof attack decompositions. To describe effects this paper appliesBarwise-Seligman's channel theory. Infomorphisms, in particular, play asignificant role to connect effects with distinct granularities. As a result,the consistency of a decomposition is formally defined and a condition for itis stated. This framework is applied to a case study of a vehicular networksystem. As an application of the idea of consistency, possible degrees ofmitigation for attacks in attack trees are discussed.

On Validating Attack Trees with Attack Effects: An Approach from Barwise-Seligman's Channel Theory