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Any successful interpretation of quantum mechanics must explain how ourempirical evidence allows us to come to know about quantum mechanics. In thisarticle, we argue that this vital criterion is not met by the class of'orthodox interpretations,' which includes QBism, neo-Copenhageninterpretations, and some versions of relational quantum mechanics. Wedemonstrate that intersubjectivity fails in radical ways in these approaches,and we explain why intersubjectivity matters for empirical confirmation. Wetake a detailed look at the way in which belief-updating might work in the kindof universe postulated by an orthodox interpretation, and argue that observersin such a universe are unable to escape their own perspective in order to learnabout the structure of the set of perspectives that is supposed to make upreality according to these interpretations. We also argue that in some versionsof these interpretations it is not even possible to use one's own relativefrequencies for empirical confirmation. Ultimately we conclude that it cannotbe rational to believe these sorts of interpretations unless they aresupplemented with some observer-independent structure which underwritesintersubjective agreement in at least certain sorts of cases.

Does Science need Intersubjectivity? The Problem of Confirmation in Orthodox Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics