English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Contemporary computing employs cache hierarchy to fill the speed gap betweenprocessors and main memories. In order to optimise system performance, LastLevel Caches(LLC) are shared among all the cores. Cache sharing has made theman attractive surface for cross-core timing channel attacks. In these attacks,an attacker running on another core can exploit the access timing of the victimprocess to infiltrate the secret information. One such attack is calledcross-core Covert Channel Attack (CCA). Timely detection and then prevention ofcross-core CCA is critical for maintaining the integrity and security of users,especially in a shared computing environment. In this work, we have proposed anefficient cross-core CCA mitigation technique. We propose a way-wise cachepartitioning on targeted sets, only for the processes suspected to beattackers. In this way, the performance impact on the entire LLC is minimised,and benign applications can utilise the LLC to its full capacity. We have useda cycle-accurate simulator (gem5) to analyse the per-formance of the proposedmethod and its security effectiveness. It has been successful in abolishing thecross-core covert timing channel attack with no significant performance impacton benign applications. It causes 23% less cache misses in comparison toexisting partitioning based solutions while requiring 0.26% storage overhead.

TPPD: Targeted Pseudo Partitioning based Defence for Cross-Core Covert Channel Attacks