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Both ride-hailing services and electric vehicles are becoming increasinglypopular and it is likely that charging management of the ride-hailing vehicleswill be a significant part of the ride-hailing company's operation in the nearfuture. Motivated by this, we propose a game theoretic model for chargingmanagement, where we assume that it is the fleet-operator that wants tominimize its operational cost, which among others include the price ofcharging. To avoid overcrowded charging stations, a central authority willdesign pricing policies to incentivize the vehicles to spread out among thecharging stations, in a setting where several ride-hailing companies competeabout the resources. We show that it is possible to construct pricing policiesthat make the Nash-equilibrium between the companies follow the centralauthority's target value when the desired load is feasible. Moreover, weprovide a decentralized algorithm for computation of the equilibrium andconclude the paper with a numerical example illustrating the results.

A Pricing Mechanism for Balancing the Charging of Ride-Hailing Electric Vehicle Fleets