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We present two attacks targeting the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum consensusprotocol. The first attack suggests a fundamental conceptual incompatibilitybetween PoS and the Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree (GHOST) fork choiceparadigm employed by PoS Ethereum. In a nutshell, PoS allows an adversary witha vanishing amount of stake to produce an unlimited number of equivocatingblocks. While most equivocating blocks will be orphaned, such orphaned `uncleblocks' still influence fork choice under the GHOST paradigm, bestowing uponthe adversary devastating control over the canonical chain. While the LatestMessage Driven (LMD) aspect of current PoS Ethereum prevents a straightforwardapplication of this attack, our second attack shows how LMD specifically can beexploited to obtain a new variant of the balancing attack that overcomes arecent protocol addition that was intended to mitigate balancing-type attacks.Thus, in its current form, PoS Ethereum without and with LMD is vulnerable toour first and second attack, respectively.

Two Attacks On Proof-of-Stake GHOST/Ethereum