English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Discovery program (DISC) is a policy used by the New York City Department ofEducation (NYC DOE) to increase the number of admissions of students from lowsocio-economic background to specialized high schools. This policy has beeninstrumental in increasing the number of disadvantaged students attending theseschools. However, assuming that students care more about the school they areassigned to rather than the type of seat they occupy (\emph{school-over-seathypothesis}), our empirical analysis using data from 12 recent academic yearsshows that DISC creates about 950 in-group blocking pairs each year amongstdisadvantaged students, impacting about 650 disadvantaged students every year.Moreover, we find that this program does not respect improvements, thusunintentionally creating an incentive to under-perform. These experimentalresults are confirmed by our theoretical analysis.  In order to alleviate the concerns caused by DISC, we explore two alternativepolicies: the minority reserve (MR) and the joint-seat allocation (JSA)mechanisms. As our main theoretical contribution, we introduce a feature ofmarkets, that we term high competitiveness, and we show that under thiscondition, JSA dominates MR for all disadvantaged students. We give sufficientconditions under which high competitiveness is verified. Data from NYC DOEsatisfies the high competitiveness condition, and for this dataset ourempirical results corroborate our theoretical predictions, showing thesuperiority of JSA. Given that JSA can be implemented by a simple modificationof the classical deferred acceptance algorithm with responsive preferencelists, we believe that, when the school-over-seat hypothesis holds, thediscovery program can be changed for the better by implementing the JSAmechanism, leading in particular to aligned incentives for the top-performingdisadvantaged students.

Discovering Opportunities in New York City's Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets