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The view that altruistic punishment plays an important role in supportingpublic cooperation among human beings and other species has been widelyaccepted by the public. However, the positive role of altruistic punishment inenhancing cooperation will be undermined if corruption is considered. Recently,behavioral experiments have confirmed this finding and further investigated theeffects of the leader's punitive power and the economic potential.Nevertheless, there are relatively few studies focusing on how these factorsaffect the evolution of cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, wecombine institutional punishment public goods games with bribery games toinvestigate the effects of the above factors on the evolution of cooperation.Theoretical and numerical results reveal that the existence of corruption willreduce the level of cooperation when cooperators are more inclined to providebribes. In addition, we demonstrate that stronger leader and richer economicpotential are both important to enhance cooperation. In particular, whendefectors are more inclined to provide bribes, stronger leaders can sustain thecontributions of public goods from cooperators if the economic potential isweak.

Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors for the evolution of cooperation