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In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategicuncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' biddingbehavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entiredistribution of opponent bids but only the expected (winning) bid and lower andupper bounds on the opponent bids. We characterize the optimal biddingstrategies and prove the existence of equilibrium beliefs. Finally, we applythe model to estimate the cost distribution in highway procurement auctions andfind good performance out-of-sample.

An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics