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Unemployment insurance transfers should balance the provision of consumptionto the unemployed with the disincentive effects on the search behavior.Developing countries face the additional challenge of informality. Workers canchoose to hide their employment state and labor income in informal jobs, anadditional form of moral hazard. To provide evidence about the effects of thispolicy in a country affected by informality we exploit kinks in the schedule oftransfers in Argentina. Our results suggest that higher benefits inducemoderate behavioral responses in job-finding rates and increase re-employmentwages. We use a sufficient statistics formula from a model with random wageoffers and we calibrate it with our estimates. We show that welfare could risesubstantially if benefits were increased in Argentina. Importantly, ourconclusion is relevant for the median eligible worker that is strongly affectedby informality.

The welfare effects of unemployment insurance in Argentina. New estimates using changes in the schedule of transfers