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Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism by which individuals cooperate with thosewho have cooperated with others. This creates a regime in which repeatedinteractions are not necessary to incent cooperation (as would be required fordirect reciprocity). However, indirect reciprocity creates a new problem: howdo agents know who has cooperated with others? To know this, agents would needto access some form of reputation information. Perhaps there is a communicationsystem to disseminate reputation information, but how does it remain truthfuland informative? Most papers assume the existence of a truthful, forthcoming,and informative communication system; in this paper, we seek to explain howsuch a communication system could remain evolutionarily stable in the absenceof exogenous pressures. Specifically, we present three conditions that togethermaintain both the truthfulness of the communication system and the prevalenceof cooperation: individuals (1) use a norm that rewards the behaviors that itprescribes (an aligned norm), (2) can signal not only about the actions ofother agents, but also about their truthfulness (by acting as third partyobservers to an interaction), and (3) make occasional mistakes, demonstratinghow error can create stability by introducing diversity.

Tit for Tattling: Cooperation, communication, and how each could stabilize the other