English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

A buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object. Both players canbuild reputations for being obstinate by offering the same price over time.Before players bargain, the seller decides whether to adopt a new technologythat can lower his cost of production. We show that even when the buyer cannotobserve the seller's adoption decision, players' reputational incentives canlead to inefficient under-adoption and significant delays in reachingagreement, and that these inefficiencies arise in equilibrium if and only ifthe social benefit from adoption is large enough. Our result implies that anincrease in the benefit from adoption may lower the probability of adoption andthat the seller's opportunity to adopt a cost-saving technology may lowersocial welfare.

Reputational Bargaining and Inefficient Technology Adoption