English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Many mechanisms behind the evolution of cooperation, such as reciprocity,indirect reciprocity, and altruistic punishment, require group knowledge ofindividual actions. But what keeps people cooperating when no one is looking?Conformist norm internalization, the tendency to abide by the behavior of themajority of the group, even when it is individually harmful, could be theanswer. In this paper, we analyze a world where (1) there is group selectionand punishment by indirect reciprocity but (2) many actions (half) gounobserved, and therefore unpunished. Can norm internalization fill this"observation gap" and lead to high levels of cooperation, even when agents mayin principle cooperate only when likely to be caught and punished?Specifically, we seek to understand whether adding norm internalization to thestrategy space in a public goods game can lead to higher levels of cooperationwhen both norm internalization and cooperation start out rare. We found theanswer to be positive, but, interestingly, not because norm internalizers endup making up a substantial fraction of the population, nor because theycooperate much more than other agent types. Instead, norm internalizers, bypolarizing, catalyzing, and stabilizing cooperation, can increase levels ofcooperation of other agent types, while only making up a minority of thepopulation themselves.

Polarize, Catalyze, Stabilize: How a minority of norm internalizers amplify group selection and punishment