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This dissertation demonstrates three new types of attacks against the KLJNscheme. The first attack type is based on compromised RNGs. The first RNGattacks are deterministic. First, Eve knows both noises. She can crack the bitvia Ohm's Law and one-bit powers within a fraction of the bit exchange period.Second, Eve knows only Bob's noise, so she can learn Bob's resistance value viaOhm's Law and Alice's resistance at the end of the bit exchange period. She canalso use a process of elimination. The second RNG attacks are statistical.First, Eve has partial knowledge of Alice's and Bob's noises. She can crack thebit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her noises and the measurednoise in the wire, and by taking the highest cross-correlation between hernoises and Alice's/Bob's noises. Second, Eve has partial knowledge of onlyAlice's noise. She can still crack the bit, but after the bit exchange period.The second attack type is based on thermodynamics. Previously, the KLJN schemerequired thermal equilibrium. However, Vadai, et al, in (Nature) ScienceReports shows a modified scheme, where there is a non-zero thermal noise, yetthe system resists all the known attacks. We utilize coincidence events betweenthe line current and voltage and show that there is non-zero information leak.As soon as thermal equilibrium is restored, the system is perfectly secureagain. The final attack type is based on the nonlinearity of the noisegenerators. We explore the effect of distortion at the second and third orders.It is demonstrated that 1% distortion results in a significant informationleak. We also show that decreasing the effective temperature results in theKLJN scheme approaching perfect security.

Random Number Generator, Zero-Crossing, and Nonlinearity Attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Protocol