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The commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) component based ecosystem provides anattractive system design paradigm due to the drastic reduction in developmenttime and cost compared to custom solutions. However, it brings in a growingconcern of trustworthiness arising from the possibility of embedded maliciouslogic, or hardware Trojans in COTS components. Existing trust-verificationapproaches are typically not applicable to COTS hardware due to the absence ofgolden models and the lack of observability of internal signals. In this work,we propose a novel approach for runtime Trojan detection and resilience inuntrusted COTS processors through judicious modifications in software. Theproposed approach does not rely on any hardware redundancy or architecturalmodification and hence seamlessly integrates with the COTS-based system designprocess. Trojan resilience is achieved through the execution of multiplefunctionally equivalent software variants. We have developed and implemented asolution for compiler-based automatic generation of program variants,metric-guided selection of variants, and their integration in a singleexecutable. To evaluate the proposed approach, we first analyzed theeffectiveness of program variants in avoiding the activation of a random poolof Trojans. By implementing several Trojans in an OpenRISC 1000 processor, weanalyzed the detectability and resilience during Trojan activation in bothsingle and multiple variants. We also present delay and code size overhead forthe automatically generated variants for several programs and discuss futureresearch directions to reduce the overhead.

Software Variants for Hardware Trojan Detection and Resilience in COTS Processors