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Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partialinformation setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents thatare "truthful". However, in general noncooperative games agents may considersending misinformation to neighboring agents with the goal of further reducingtheir cost. Additionally, communication networks are vulnerable to attacks fromagents outside the game as well as communication failures. In this paper, wepropose a distributed NE seeking algorithm that is robust against adversarialagents that transmit noise, random signals, constant singles, deceitfulmessages, as well as being resilient to external factors such as droppedcommunication, jammed signals, and man in the middle attacks. The core issuethat makes the problem challenging is that agents have no means of verifying ifthe information they receive is correct, i.e. there is no "ground truth". Toaddress this problem, we use an observation graph, that gives truthful actioninformation, in conjunction with a communication graph, that gives (potentiallyincorrect) information. By filtering information obtained from these twographs, we show that our algorithm is resilient against adversarial agents andconverges to the Nash equilibrium.

Resilient Nash Equilibrium Seeking in the Partial Information Setting