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Tor, an onion-routing anonymity network, has been shown to be vulnerable toWebsite Fingerprinting (WF), which de-anonymizes web browsing by analyzing theunique characteristics of the encrypted network traffic. Although many defenseshave been proposed, few have been implemented and tested in the real world;others were only simulated. Due to its synthetic nature, simulation may fail tocapture the real performance of these defenses. To figure out how thesedefenses perform in the real world, we propose WFDefProxy, a general platformfor WF defense implementation on Tor using pluggable transports. We create thefirst full implementation of three WF defenses: FRONT, Tamaraw and Random-WT.We evaluate each defense in both simulation and implementation to compare theirresults, and we find that simulation correctly captures the strength of eachdefense against attacks. In addition, we confirm that Random-WT is noteffective in both simulation and implementation, reducing the strongestattacker's accuracy by only 7%.  We also found a minor difference in overhead between simulation andimplementation. We analyze how this may be due to assumptions made insimulation regarding packet delays and queuing, or the soft stop condition weimplemented in WFDefProxy to detect the end of a page load. The implementationof FRONT cost about 23% more data overhead than simulation, while theimplementation of Tamaraw cost about 28% - 45% less data overhead. In addition,the implementation of Tamaraw incurred only 21% time overhead, compared to 51%- 242% estimated by simulation in previous work.

WFDefProxy: Modularly Implementing and Empirically Evaluating Website Fingerprinting Defenses