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Precise information is essential for making good policies, especially thoseregarding reform decisions. However, decision-makers may hesitate to gathersuch information if certain decisions could have negative impacts on theirfuture careers. We model how decision-makers with career concerns may acquirepolicy-relevant information and carry out reform decisions when their policydiscretion can be limited ex ante. Typically, decision-makers with careerconcerns have weaker incentives to acquire information compared todecision-makers without such concerns. In this context, we demonstrate that thepublic can encourage information acquisition by eliminating either the"moderate policy" or the status quo from decision-makers' discretion. We alsoanalyze when reform decisions should be strategically delegated todecision-makers with or without career concerns.

The Politics of (No) Compromise: Information Acquisition, Policy Discretion, and Reputation