English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences followthe maxmin expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priorsconsists of beliefs close to the seller's belief, where "closeness" is definedby a divergence. For a given allocation rule, we identify a class of optimaltransfer candidates, named the win-lose dependent transfers, with the followingproperty: each type of bidder's transfer conditional on winning or losing isindependent of the competitor's type report. Our result reduces theinfinite-dimensional optimal transfer problem to a two-dimensional optimizationproblem. By solving the reduced problem, we find that: (i) among efficientmechanisms with no premiums for losers, the first-price auction is optimal;and, (ii) among efficient winner-favored mechanisms where each bidder payssmaller amounts when she wins than loses: the all-pay auction is optimal. Undera simplifying assumption, these two auctions remain optimal under theendogenous allocation rule.

Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions