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Mobile devices often distribute measurements from physical sensors tomultiple applications using software multiplexing. On Android devices, thehighest requested sampling frequency is returned to all applications, even ifothers request measurements at lower frequencies. In this paper, wecomprehensively demonstrate that this design choice exposes practicallyexploitable side-channels using frequency-key shifting. By carefully modulatingsensor sampling frequencies in software, we show how unprivileged maliciousapplications can construct reliable spectral covert channels that bypassexisting security mechanisms. Additionally, we present a novel variant thatallows an unprivileged malicious application to profile other active,sensor-enabled applications at a coarse-grained level. Both methods do notimpose any special assumptions beyond accessing standard mobile servicesavailable to developers. As such, our work reports side-channel vulnerabilitiesthat exploit subtle yet insecure design choices in Android sensor stacks.

A Side-channel Analysis of Sensor Multiplexing for Covert Channels and Application Profiling on Mobile Devices