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of PMUs to cyber-physical system pro-vides accurate dataacquisition, while posing additional risk of being the victim of cyber attack.Both False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) and GPS-spoofing or timing attack canprovide malicious data to the cyber system, though these two attacks requiredifferent post-attack contingency plan. Thus accurate detection of timingattack and separating it from conventional FDIA has become a very importantresearch area. In this article, a successful detection of timing attackmechanism is proposed. Firstly, a method to distinguish timing attack and FDIAusing unwrapped phase angle data is developed. Secondly, utilizing low rankHenkel matrix property to differentiate timing attack from electrical events isalso presented. Finally, an experimental validation of proposed model isperformed on IEEE 13 bus system using simulated GPS-spoofing attack. It can beobserved that the timing attack can increase the rank 1 approximation error ofHenkel matrix of unwrapped angles by 700% for 3 sec delay in GPS time-stamp.The rank 1 approximation error is increased by 500% for 2 sec delay and theincrease is insignificant for 1sec delay attack. FDIA doesn't show anysignificant change in the low rank approximation profile of Henkel matrix.

Detecting Timing Attack on PMU Data utilizing Unwrapped Phase Angle and Low-Rank Henkel Matrix Properties