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We consider a queue with an unobservable backlog by the incoming users. Thereis an information designer that observes the queue backlog and makesrecommendations to the users arriving at the queue whether to join or not tojoin the queue. The arriving users have payoff relevant private types. Theusers, upon arrival, send a message, that is supposed to be their type, to theinformation designer if they are willing to hear a recommendation. Theinformation designer then creates a recommendation for that specific type ofuser. The users have to pay a tax in exchange for the information they receive.In this setting, the information designer has two types of commitments. Thefirst commitment is the recommendation policy and the second commitment is thetax function. We combine mechanism design and information design to study aqueuing system with heterogeneous users. In this setting, the informationdesigner is a sender of the information in the information design aspect and areceiver in the mechanism design aspect of the model. We formulate anoptimization problem that characterizes the solution of the joint designproblem. We characterize the tax functions and provide structural results forthe recommendation policy of the information designer.

Joint Information and Mechanism Design for Queues with Heterogeneous Users