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Micro-architectural attacks use information leaked through shared resourcesto break hardware-enforced isolation. These attacks have been used to stealprivate information ranging from cryptographic keys to privileged OperatingSystem (OS) data in devices ranging from mobile phones to cloud servers. Mostexisting software countermeasures either have unacceptable overheads orconsiderable false positives. Further, they are designed for specific attacksand cannot readily adapt to new variants.  In this paper, we propose a framework called LEASH, which works from the OSscheduler to stymie micro-architectural attacks with minimal overheads,negligible impact of false positives, and is capable of handling a wide rangeof attacks. LEASH works by starving maliciously behaving threads at runtime,providing insufficient time and resources to carry out an attack. The CPUallocation for a falsely flagged thread found to be benign is boosted tominimize overheads. To demonstrate the framework, we modify Linux's CompletelyFair Scheduler with LEASH and evaluate it with seven micro-architecturalattacks ranging from Meltdown and Rowhammer to a TLB covert channel. Theruntime overheads are evaluated with a range of real-world applications andfound to be less than 1% on average.

LEASH: Enhancing Micro-architectural Attack Detection with a Reactive Process Scheduler