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The security of the Internet rests on a small number of open-sourcecryptographic libraries: a vulnerability in any one of them threatens tocompromise a significant percentage of web traffic. Despite this potential forsecurity impact, the characteristics and causes of vulnerabilities incryptographic software are not well understood. In this work, we conduct thefirst comprehensive analysis of cryptographic libraries and the vulnerabilitiesaffecting them. We collect data from the National Vulnerability Database,individual project repositories and mailing lists, and other relevant sourcesfor eight widely used cryptographic libraries.  Among our most interesting findings is that only 27.2% of vulnerabilities incryptographic libraries are cryptographic issues while 37.2% of vulnerabilitiesare memory safety issues, indicating that systems-level bugs are a greatersecurity concern than the actual cryptographic procedures. In our investigationof the causes of these vulnerabilities, we find evidence of a strongcorrelation between the complexity of these libraries and their (in)security,empirically demonstrating the potential risks of bloated cryptographiccodebases. We further compare our findings with non-cryptographic systems,observing that these systems are, indeed, more complex than similarcounterparts, and that this excess complexity appears to produce significantlymore vulnerabilities in cryptographic libraries than in non-cryptographicsoftware.

You Really Shouldn't Roll Your Own Crypto: An Empirical Study of Vulnerabilities in Cryptographic Libraries