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This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionarystability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Manystudies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperationbecause they reduce the expected length of mutual cooperation by triggering theconditional retaliation of the cooperators. However, this study shows thatbehavioral mistakes could have positive effects. Conditional cooperativestrategies are either neutrally stable or are unstable in a mistake-freeenvironment, but we show that behavioral mistakes can make \textit{all} of theconditional cooperative strategies evolutionarily stable. We show thatbehavioral mistakes stabilize the cooperative equilibrium based on the mostintolerant cooperative strategy by eliminating the behavioralindistinguishability between conditional cooperators in the cooperativeequilibrium. We also show that mistakes make the tolerant conditionalcooperative strategies evolutionarily stable by preventing the defectors fromaccumulating the free-rider's advantages. Lastly, we show that the behavioralmistakes could serve as a criterion for the equilibrium selection amongcooperative equilibria.

Behavioral Mistakes Support Cooperation in an N-Person Repeated Public Goods Game