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This paper proposes a model to explain the potential role of inter-groupconflicts in determining the rise and fall of signaling norms. Individuals in apopulation are characterized by high and low productivity types and they arematched in pairs to form social relationships such as mating or foragingrelationships. In each relationship, an individual's payoff is increasing inits own type and its partner's type. Hence, the payoff structure of arelationship does not resemble a dilemma situation. Assume that types are notobservable. In one population, assortative matching according to types issustained by signaling. In the other population, individuals do not signal andthey are randomly matched. Types evolve within each population. At the sametime, the two populations may engage in conflicts. Due to assortative matching,high types grow faster in the population with signaling, yet they bear the costof signaling, which lowers their population's fitness in the long run. Throughsimulations, we show that the survival of the signaling population dependscrucially on the timing and the efficiency of weapon used in inter-groupconflicts.

Conflicts, Assortative Matching, and the Evolution of Signaling Norms