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We investigate the vulnerability of a power transmission grid to loadoscillation attacks. We demonstrate that an adversary with a relatively smallamount of resources can launch a successful load oscillation attack todestabilize the grid. The adversary is assumed to be able to compromise smartmeters at a subset of load buses and control their switches. In the studiedattack scenarios the adversary estimates the line flow sensitivity factors(LFSFs) associated with the monitored tie lines by perturbing a small amount ofload at compromised buses and observing the monitored lines flow changes. Thelearned LFSF values are used for selecting a target line and optimizing theoscillation attack to cause the target line to trip while minimizing themagnitude of load oscillation. We evaluated the attack impact using the COSMICtime-domain simulator with two test cases, the IEEE RTS 96 and Polish 2383-BusSystems. The proposed attack strategy succeeded in causing 33% of load to beshed while oscillating only 7% of load in the IEEE RTS 96 test system, and fullblackout after oscillating only 3% of the load in the Polish test system, whichis much smaller than oscillation magnitudes used by other benchmarks.

Load Oscillating Attacks of Smart Grids: Demand Strategies and Vulnerability Analysis