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In this paper, we propose a novel class of symmetric key distributionprotocols that leverages basic security primitives offered by low-cost,hardware chipsets containing millions of synchronized self-powered timers. Thekeys are derived from the temporal dynamics of a physical, micro-scaletime-keeping device which makes the keys immune to any potential side-channelattacks, malicious tampering, or snooping. Using the behavioral model of theself-powered timers, we first show that the derived key-strings can pass therandomness test as defined by the National Institute of Standards andTechnology (NIST) suite. The key-strings are then used in two SPoTKD(Self-Powered Timer Key Distribution) protocols that exploit the timer'sdynamics as one-way functions: (a) protocol 1 facilitates secure communicationsbetween a user and a remote Server, and (b) protocol 2 facilitates securecommunications between two users. In this paper, we investigate the security ofthese protocols under standard model and against different adversarial attacks.Using Monte-Carlo simulations, we also investigate the robustness of theseprotocols in the presence of real-world operating conditions and proposeerror-correcting SPoTKD protocols to mitigate these noise-related artifacts.

SPoTKD: A Protocol for Symmetric Key Distribution over Public Channels Using Self-Powered Timekeeping Devices