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We consider the probabilistic planning problem where the agent (called Player1, or P1) can jointly plan the control actions and sensor queries in a sensornetwork and an attacker (called player 2, or P2) can carry out attacks on thesensors. We model such an adversarial interaction using a formal model -- areachability game with partially controllable observation functions. The maincontribution of this paper is to assess the cost of P1's unawareness: SupposeP1 misinterprets the sensor failures as probabilistic node failures due tounreliable network communication, and P2 is aware of P1's misinterpretation inaddition to her partial observability. Then, from which states can P2 carry outsensor attacks to ensure, with probability one, that P1 will not be able tocomplete her reachability task even though, due to misinterpretation, P1believes that she can almost-surely achieve her task. We develop an algorithmto solve the almost-sure winning sensor-attack strategy given P1'sobservation-based strategy. Our attack analysis could be used for attackdetection in wireless communication networks and the design of provably securedattack-aware sensor allocation in decision-theoretic models for cyber-physicalsystems.

Qualitative Planning in Imperfect Information Games with Active Sensing and Reactive Sensor Attacks: Cost of Unawareness