English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

The war of attrition in game theory is a model of a stand-off situationbetween two opponents where the winner is determined by its persistence. Wemodel a stand-off between a predator and a prey when the prey is hiding and thepredator is waiting for the prey to come out from its refuge, or when the twoare locked in a situation of mutual threat of injury or even death. Thestand-off is resolved when the predator gives up or when the prey tries toescape. Instead of using the asymmetric war of attrition, we embed thestand-off as an integral part of the predator-prey model of Rosenzweig andMacArthur derived from first principles. We apply this model to study thecoevolution of the giving-up rates of the prey and the predator, using theadaptive dynamics approach. We find that the long term evolutionary processleads to three qualitatively different scenarios: the predator gives upimmediately, while the prey never gives up; the predator never gives up, whilethe prey adopts any giving-up rate greater than or equal to a given positivethreshold value; the predator goes extinct. We observe that some results arethe same as for the asymmetric war of attrition, but others are quitedifferent.

Coevolution of the reckless prey and the patient predator