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Verifying integrity of software execution in low-end micro-controller units(MCUs) is a well-known open problem. The central challenge is how to securelydetect software exploits with minimal overhead, since these MCUs are designedfor low cost, low energy and small size. Some recent work yielded inexpensivehardware/software co-designs for remotely verifying code and executionintegrity. In particular, a means of detecting unauthorized code modificationsand control-flow attacks were proposed, referred to as Remote Attestation (RA)and Control-Flow Attestation (CFA), respectively. Despite this progress,detection of data-only attacks remains elusive. Such attacks exploit softwarevulnerabilities to corrupt intermediate computation results stored in datamemory, changing neither the program code nor its control flow. Motivated bylack of any current techniques (for low-end MCUs) that detect these attacks, inthis paper we propose, implement and evaluate DIALED, the first Data-FlowAttestation (DFA) technique applicable to the most resource-constrainedembedded devices (e.g., TI MSP430). DIALED works in tandem with a companion CFAscheme to detect all (currently known) types of runtime software exploits atfairly low cost.

DIALED: Data Integrity Attestation for Low-end Embedded Devices