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We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leveragecontention on the CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make ituniquely difficult to exploit this channel. First, little is known about thering interconnect's functioning and architecture. Second, information that canbe learned by an attacker through ring contention is noisy by nature and hascoarse spatial granularity. To address the first challenge, we perform athorough reverse engineering of the sophisticated protocols that handlecommunication on the ring interconnect. With this knowledge, we build across-core covert channel over the ring interconnect with a capacity of over 4Mbps from a single thread, the largest to date for a cross-core channel notrelying on shared memory. To address the second challenge, we leverage thefine-grained temporal patterns of ring contention to infer a victim program'ssecrets. We demonstrate our attack by extracting key bits from vulnerable EdDSAand RSA implementations, as well as inferring the precise timing of keystrokestyped by a victim user.

Lord of the Ring(s): Side Channel Attacks on the CPU On-Chip Ring Interconnect Are Practical