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Over the last decade, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) have beenincreasingly targeted by attackers to obtain control over industrial processesthat support critical services. Such targeted attacks typically requiredetailed knowledge of system-specific attributes, including hardwareconfigurations, adopted protocols, and PLC control-logic, i.e. processcomprehension. The consensus from both academics and practitioners suggestsstealthy process comprehension obtained from a PLC alone, to conduct targetedattacks, is impractical. In contrast, we assert that current PLC programmingpractices open the door to a new vulnerability class based on control-logicconstructs. To support this, we propose the concept of Process Comprehension ata Distance (PCaaD), as a novel methodological and automatable approach forsystem-agnostic exploitation of PLC library functions, leading to the targetedexfiltration of operational data, manipulation of control-logic behavior, andestablishment of covert command and control channels through unused memory. Wevalidate PCaaD on widely used PLCs, by identification of practical attacks.

PCaaD: Towards Automated Determination and Exploitation of Industrial Processes