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The North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) public-private Space AssetSupply Chain (SASC) currently exhibits significant cybersecurity gaps. It iswell-established that data obtained from space assets is fundamental to NATO,as they allow for the facilitation of its missions, self-defence and effectivedeterrence of its adversaries. Any hostile cyber operation, suspending controlover a space asset, severely impacts both NATO missions and allied MemberStates national security. This threat is exacerbated by NATOs mostlyunregulated cyber SASC. Hence, this thesis answers a twofold research question:a) What are current cybersecurity gaps along NATOs global SASC; and b) How canNATO and its allied Member States gain greater control over such gaps tosafeguard the supply of NATO mission-critical information? An ontological fieldstudy is carried out by conducting nineteen semi-structured interviews withhigh-level representatives from relevant public, private and academicorganizations. This research was undertaken in collaboration with the NATOCooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia.This thesis concludes that current cybersecurity gaps along NATOs SASC arecaused by cyber vulnerabilities such as legacy systems or the use ofCommercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technology. Inadequate cyber SASC management iscaused by hindrances such as misaligned classification levels and significantunderstaffing. On this basis, NATO should consider two major collaborationinitiatives: a) Raising Awareness throughout the whole of the NATO system, andb) Pushing forward the creation of regulation through a standardized securityframework on SASC cybersecurity. Doing so would enable NATO and its MemberStates to recognise cyberthreats to mission-critical data early on along itscyber SASC, and thus increase transparency, responsibility, and liability.

NATOs Mission-Critical Space Capabilities under Threat: Cybersecurity Gaps in the Military Space Asset Supply Chain