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Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication tothird parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertionof a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present aframework for designing and inserting an SCT based on an engineering changeorder (ECO) flow, which makes it the first to disclose how effortlessly atrojan can be inserted into an IC. The trojan is designed with the goal ofleaking multiple bits per power signature reading. Our findings and resultsshow that a rogue element within a foundry has, today, all means necessary forperforming a foundry-side attack via ECO.

Side-Channel Trojan Insertion -- a Practical Foundry-Side Attack via ECO