English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

This paper initiates a discussion of mechanism design when the participatingagents exhibit preferences that deviate from expected utility theory (EUT). Inparticular, we consider mechanism design for systems where the agents aremodeled as having cumulative prospect theory (CPT) preferences, which is ageneralization of EUT preferences. We point out some of the key modificationsneeded in the theory of mechanism design that arise from agents having CPTpreferences and some of the shortcomings of the classical mechanism designframework. In particular, we show that the revelation principle, which hastraditionally played a fundamental role in mechanism design, does not continueto hold under CPT. We develop an appropriate framework that we call mediatedmechanism design which allows us to recover the revelation principle for CPTagents. We conclude with some interesting directions for future work.

Mechanism Design for Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Agents: A General Framework and the Revelation Principle