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We study the consequences of job markets' heavy reliance on referrals.Referrals screen candidates and lead to better matches and increasedproductivity, but disadvantage job-seekers who have few or no connections toemployed workers, leading to increased inequality. Coupled with homophily,referrals also lead to immobility: a demographic group's low current employmentrate leads that group to have relatively low future employment as well. Weidentify conditions under which distributing referrals more evenly across apopulation not only reduces inequality, but also improves future productivityand economic mobility. We use the model to examine optimal policies, showingthat one-time affirmative action policies involve short-run production losses,but lead to long-term improvements in equality, mobility, and productivity dueto induced changes in future referrals. We also examine how the possibility offiring workers changes the effects of referrals.

The Role of Referrals in Immobility, Inequality, and Inefficiency in Labor Markets